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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
The case arises out of a contract executed by Enoch Smith, Jr. and D. A.
Osguthorpe on November 3, 1966, dissolving their partnership. The agreement
provides that Enoch Smith, Jr. retains certain rights in partnership property. The case
is brought to determine whether his estate is entitled to those rights and what those
rights are.
B. Course of Proceedings.
Appellee adopts the course of proceedings set forth in Appellants' brief.
C. Disposition By Trial Court.
Appellee adopts the disposition by trial court expressed in Appellants'
brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee, Enoch Richard Smith, (referred to throughout this brief as "Dick
Smith") objects to Appellants' (herein "The Osguthorpes") Statement of Facts because
most of the "facts" rely on affidavits by D. A. Osguthorpe containing information that
the trial court deemed barred by the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule.
Therefore, Dick Smith offers the following as the facts upon which the trial court relied
in making its rulings:
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1.

Prior to 1966, Enoch Smith, Jr. ("Smith"), Dick Smith's father, and D. A.

Osguthorpe ("D. A. Osguthorpe") were partners in a sheep and cattle business in
Summit County, Utah. Under date of November 3, 1966, Smith and D. A.
Osguthorpe entered into a written agreement dissolving several partnerships that had
existed between them, pursuant to which Smith agreed to sell to D. A. Osguthorpe his
interest in certain partnership property described in the agreement (herein "the
Dissolution Agreement"). The Dissolution Agreement was signed by both Smith and
D. A. Osguthorpe and notarized. D. A. Osguthorpe's wife also signed a clause
wherein she agreed that any interest she may have in the property described in
paragraph 1 (g) of the Dissolution Agreement was subject to the terms of the
Dissolution Agreement. Her signature was also notarized. The Dissolution
Agieement was recorded on January 16, 1967, in the records of the Summit County
Recorder as Entry 104566 in Book M9 at pages 327 to 334. (A copy of the Dissolution
Agreement is attached as Addendum No. 1.) (R. 7-14)
2.

A specific provision relating to the partnership assets and properties

covered by the Dissolution Agreement stated (in material part):
"(g) In addition to the above described property, [Smith]
agrees to sell to [D. A. Osguthorpe], his interest in the
following described real property located in Summit County,
Utah, subject, however, to the reservation of interests
therein by [Smith] as hereinafter specifically set forth:
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[A metes and bounds description of real property
containing 577.33 acres is set forth.]
So long as [D. A. Osguthorpe] shall use said real property
as grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep
or cattle business,
[D. A. Osguthorpe] shall have the
right to the possession and use of the property without
compensation to [Smith], but he shall pay the taxes and any
expense of maintaining the property. In the event, however,
that
[D. A. Osguthorpe] or his successor or successors in
interest, during the lifetime of the survivor of [Smith and D.
A. Osguthorpe], plus twenty-one (21) years, in a good faith
transaction,
shall lease all or any part of the property,
for any period of time commencing during said retained
interest period, at a price in excess of $1.60 per acre per
year, [Smith] shall share equally in the excess rental over
the $1.60 per acre per year. Furthermore, [Smith] shall
retain an undivided one-half (Vi) interest in all mineral and
oil rights in the property without limit as to time" (R. 910.)
(The real property referenced above is referred to herein as the "Property".)
3.

The D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, one of whose members is

D. A. Osguthoipe, acquired a portion of Property after the Dissolution Agreement's
execution. (R. 2, 13; R. 18, 13.)
4.

Smith died on November 11, 1996; D. A. Osguthorpe is still alive. (R.

18, 16.)
5.

On August 14, 1996, The Osguthorpes executed a document entitled

"Lease Agreement" whereby they leased the Property to Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.
for a period of 28 years from August 14, 1996, at an annual rental of $100,000.00. (A
-3-

copy of the Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2.) (R. 69-70; 7980.)
6. In July, 1997, ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation, succeeded to the
interests of Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., including its interest in the Lease
Agreement, which it assumed and undertook to perform. ASC Utah, Inc. thereafter
operated under the name "The Canyons".
7.

In July of 1997, The Osguthorpes and The Canyons amended the Lease

Agreement to increase the rental of the property to $150,000.00 per year. (A copy of
this amendment ("First Amendment") is attached hereto as Addendum No. 3.) (R. 7172; 79-80.)
8.

In August of 1998, the Lease agreement was further amended to provide

that the rental of the property be increased to $200,000.00 per year. (A copy of this
amendment ("Second Amendment") is attached hereto as Addendum No. 4.) (R. 73-75;
79-80.)
9. Dick Smith, the Personal Representative of the Estate of Enoch Smith, Jr.,
Deceased, brought this action in November, 1998. (R. 1-14.)
10.

Under the terms of the Lease Agreement, as amended, The Osguthorpes

have received the following payments:
August 14, 1996

$100,000.00

-4-

August 12, 1997

$150,000.00

August 7, 1998

$200,000.00

August 5, 1999

$200,000.00

August 14, 2000

$200,000.00

(R. 381,390-392.)
11.

If the property were rented at the rate of $1.60 per acre per year, the

annual rental would be $923.73. (R. 9; derived from computation.)
12.

Judgment was entered June 6, 2001, in the amount of $498,441.02, -

including prejudgment interest through September 20, 2000. Under the judgment, daily
prejudgment interest accrues at $88.53 per day from September 20, 2000, until the date
judgment is entered, and thereafter postjudgment interest accrues at the rate allowed by
law. The Judgment includes court costs of $507.27. (R. 799-800.)
13. The Osguthorpes' Statement of Facts Nos. 3 and 7 are partly accurate. In
1966 the record title to the Property was in the name of D. A. Osguthorpe. The
remaining portion of The Osguthorpes' Statements of Fact and all of their Statements of
Fact Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12,13,14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are derived from
affidavits of D. A. Osguthorpe, the information from which Judge Iwasaki ruled as
being inadmissable and irrelevant by virtue of the Statue of Frauds and the parol
evidence rule.
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14. The Osguthorpes' Statement of Fact No. 10 refers to a financial statement
of the partnership which was referred to only incidentally by Judge Iwasaki. Judge
Iwasaki ruled that the Property was partnership property because the Dissolution
Agreement declared it to be such. (R. 204-205; Memorandum Decision 12/15/99.)
(R. 603, Memorandum Decision 9/12/2000.)
15. The Osguthorpes' Statements of Fact Nos. 23 and 24 refer to statements by
Blaise Carrig, an officer of The Canyons, which Judge Iwasaki ruled were inadmissable
by virtue of the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. (R. 606-07.)
16. Statements of Fact Nos. 20, 21 and 22 are accurate.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Dick Smith supports his position in this lawsuit with a few core documents: the
Dissolution Agreement and the Lease Agreement with The Canyons, as amended. That
is the basis of his claim.
The issues initially raised by The Osguthorpes were:
1)

The Dissolution Agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint on

alienation and was therefore void;
2)

The Lease Agreement with The Canyons was not a lease but the grant of

an "easement";
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3)

The Osguthorpes continued to use the Property for grazing in their sheep

and cattle business and therefore did not have to make payments to Smith; and
4)

There was no consideration for the purchase. This last defense was

based on D. A. Osguthorpe's affidavit wherein he claimed that he and Smith had
dissolved the partnership prior to the execution of the Dissolution Agreement and
therefore the agreement was of no force or effect. (Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R.
117.)
On December 15, 1999, Judge Iwasaki ruled, pursuant to Dick Smith's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, that the Dissolution Agreement did not constitute an
unreasonable restraint on alienation; that the Lease Agreement and its amendments with
The Canyons was a "lease," not an easement; that the clear language of the Dissolution
Agreement relating to the grazing exception did not protect The Osguthorpes from their
requirement to share the lease rentals; and that the contentions of The Osguthorpes with
respect to the so-called oral statements made to Osguthorpe prior to the execution of the
Dissolution Agreement were contradicted by the agreement itself and therefore barred
by the Statute of Frauds. (Memorandum Decision, R. 202-209.)
After Judge Iwasaki's rulings and in response to Dick Smith's discovery request
concerning the amount of money paid to The Osguthorpes under the Lease Agreement,
as amended, The Osguthorpes suddenly contended that the payments were not really
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lease payments - they were primarily payments "for the purpose of compensating
Defendants for their services, consultation and goodwill..." (Defendants' Responses to
Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendants dated March 10, 2000; R. 37683.)
Thereafter The Osguthorpes requested Judge Iwasaki to reconsider his grant of
summary judgment in favor of Dick Smith, and renewed their claims that prior to the
execution of the Dissolution Agreement, D. A. Osguthorpe and Smith had orally settled
the dissolution of the partnership, and that there was no consideration for the execution
of the Dissolution Agreement. The Osguthorpes contended that D. A. Osguthorpe had
never conveyed title to the Property to the partnership, and that the Property was not a
partnership asset. The Osguthorpes also argued that the Lease Agreement, as amended,
did not include all of the terms of the agreement and that part of the agreement was for
personal services.
At the same time, The Osguthorpes requested leave to file an amended answer
and counterclaim in order to assert these various claims and defenses.
In the meantime, based on The Osguthorpes' admission that moneys were paid
by The Canyons pursuant to the Lease Agreement, as amended, Dick Smith filed a
motion for summary judgment. The Osguthorpes opposed the motion, contending that
the payments were not merely lease payments but were also payments for personal
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services. Both D. A. Osguthorpe, in an affidavit, and Blaise Carrig, an officer of The
Canyons, in deposition, stated that part of the payments were intended for personal
services. Neither D. A. Osguthorpe nor Carrig were able to describe just what the
terms of the personal service contract was, although they both stated that whatever
agreement there was, it was oral.
On September 12, 2000, Judge Iwasaki denied The Osguthorpes' motion to
reconsider his prior ruling. He noted that the Dissolution Agreement was an integrated
contract and satisfied the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Further, Judge Iwasaki
ruled that the Property was partnership property. He then ruled that the Lease
Agreement, as amended, was an integrated contract, was indeed a lease, and that the
oral side agreement for personal services was barred by the Statute of Frauds. The oral
side agreement was also disallowed because it contained no price term. Dick Smith's
motion for summary judgment was granted. (R. 602-08.)
Objecting to Dick Smith's form of judgment, The Osguthorpes filed a motion to
dismiss Dick Smith's complaint for failure to join indispensable parties. This motion
was based on the contention that the Canyons and Stephen Osguthorpe
(D. A. Osguthorpe's son) had entered into a contract for personal services (to wit: the
Lease Agreement) and that by granting Dick Smith a judgment for one half of the
rentals since the Lease's inception, the judgment would impair the contract between
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The Canyons and Stephen Osguthorpe (also referred to as "Stephen"). It was argued
that since these third parties would be adversely affected by the judgment, they should
have been made parties.
In opposition to The Osguthorpes' motion, Dick Smith responded that he had no
claim against either Stephen or The Canyons. Further, the motion was untimely
because Stephen (a partner in defendant Osguthorpe Family Partnership) was well
aware of the issues in the case and could have intervened if he wished. Similarly, The
Canyons was also aware of the issues, its principal officer having testified the year
before.
Judge Iwasaki, concerned about the issues raised, entered an order dated January
16, 2001, whereby he invited both Stephen and The Canyons to "file their opposition,
if any, to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment within ten days of the date of this
Order." Upon completion of the briefing, Judge Iwasaki said he would reconsider his
September 13th (sic) decision and issue a written ruling. (R. 725.)
The Canyons did not participate in the case in response to Judge Iwasaki's
invitation. Stephen, however, filed an affidavit in which he asserted that he had an
"involvement" with his father in negotiating the Lease Agreement with Wolf Mountain,
that the agreement was for both real estate and personal services and that he was a
party to "the larger agreement to provide services." (Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe,
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January 26, 2001, p.2; R. 750.) In the affidavit Stephen admits that the amendments to
the original lease agreement were "prepared solely to protect the interest of The
Canyons in the real estate..." (Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, p.3; R. 751.) He
contends that the Lease Agreement and its amendments were not intended to
incorporate all of the terms of the relationship with The Osguthorpes. He does not,
however, set forth just exactly what those terms were.
Judge Iwasaki, in his Memorandum Decision dated May 25, 2001, concluded
that he was right the first time. Judge Iwasaki affirmed his September 12th ruling, and
held that the testimony of Stephen Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig with regard to the oral
side agreement for personal services was barred by the Statute of Frauds. Further, no
specific terms were ever determined as to just what the personal services agreement
was. (R. 791-98.)
It is Dick Smith's position that all of Judge Iwasaki's rulings on the various
claims of The Osguthorpes were correct. The Osguthorpes challenge each of these
rulings by Judge Iwasaki, and raise thirteen issues on appeal. Each of the challenges is
without merit.
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ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Dick Smith, Appellee, objects to The Osguthorpes' statement of the standard of

review with respect to Issue No. 5 referencing the denial of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss For Failure to Join Indispensable Parties. The proper standard of review is
expressed in Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989); aff'd sub
nom. Landes v. Capital Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990): "Ordinarily, a trial
court's determination, properly entered under Rule 19, will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion." Otherwise Dick Smith has no objection to the standards of review
set forth by The Osguthorpes.
II.

THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT IS A BINDING CONTRACT
BETWEEN SMITH AND D. A. OSGUTHORPE AND GOVERNS THEIR
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.
Paragraph 1(g) of the Dissolution Agreement says that if D. A. Osguthorpe sells

the Property for more than $20.00 per acre, or leases it for more than $1.60 per acre
per year, D. A. Osguthorpe will share evenly with Smith everything received over
those amounts. This contract binds the parties. The Canyons is paying $200,000 per
year to The Osguthorpes under its lease, which is $199,076.27 per year more than
$1.60 per acre.
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When a valid contract exists, the contracting parties are bound by the agreement.
John Call Engineering. Inc. v. Manti Citv Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987). Courts
should be hesitant to intervene and disrupt a valid contract simply because one of the
contracting parties has subsequently grown dissatisfied with the contract and its terms.
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica. Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Biesinger v.
Behunin. 584 P.2d 801 (Utah 1978).
A.

The Dissolution Agreement is an integrated contract. The parol
evidence rule bars introduction of evidence contravening its terms.

The Osguthorpes seek to avoid their obligations under the Dissolution
Agreement by introducing evidence that the Dissolution Agreement did not reflect
D. A. Osguthorpe's intention. D. A. Osguthorpe signed the Dissolution Agreement,
his signature was notarized and the document was recorded. Judge Iwasaki correctly
ruled that any evidence contravening the terms of the Dissolution Agreement was
barred by the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule operates to exclude
evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for
the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. Hall v. Process
Instruments and Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995). The first step in a parol
evidence analysis is to determine whether or not the contract is integrated. An
integrated agreement is "a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or
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more terms of an agreement." Id. at 1027 (citations omitted). The writing must be the
"final and complete expression of [the parties'] bargain." Id.
The Dissolution Agreement is an integrated contract. Its provisions make clear
that it was intended to be the final and complete expression of the parties' agreement to
dissolve the Partnership. For example, the Dissolution Agreement, Page 1, states:
WHEREAS, First [Smith] and Second [D. A. Osguthorpe]
Parties have heretofore terminated all partnership relations
entered into by them as partners and have discontinued the
partnership businesses, dissolved the partnership or
partnerships that have heretofore existed between them, and
now desire to settle all of the rights between them in the
partnership businesses and affairs:
(Emphasis Added.)
Later in the document, the parties reiterate that their partnership is over and they
release and discharge one another from all claims arising out of their former
partnership(s). (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 4 - 6; R. 10-12.) On its face, the
Dissolution Agreement unambiguously constitutes the complete, final, and integrated
agreement of the parties to terminate their partnership relationships.
B.

The Dissolution Agreement unambiguously declares that the disputed
Property was an asset of the partnership.

Where a contract is integrated, any evidence in addition to the terms of the
agreement is excluded if the contract is unambiguous. Hall, 866 P.2d at 606. "A court
may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract
-14-

language is ambiguous or uncertain." Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, J9, 977 P.2d
550, citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); see also, Ward
v. Intermountain Farmers Assvn. 9U7 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995). Utah courts have recently
and consistently excluded extrinsic evidence where, on the face of an integrated
contract, its terms are unambiguous. See Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, iff 16-19, 979
P.2d 338; Lee, 1999 UT App 126 f 1 9-12 ("The contract unambiguously establishes a
closing date . . . Therefore, extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to demonstrate
the intentions or knowledge of the parties."); SLW/Utah. L.C. v. Griffiths. 967 P.2d
534, 535-36 (Utah App. 1998). A question of fact arises only when the contract
document itself is subject to more than one tenable interpretation. SME Inc. v.
Thompson Ventulett. Stainback. 2001 UT 54, 1 15, 28 P.3d 669.
The Dissolution Agreement unambiguously declares that the Property is property
of the partnership. Section 1 describes the partnership's "assets and properties,"
including in paragraph 1(g) the Property itself. Paragraph 1(g) states that Smith agrees
to "sell... his interest in the following described real property" to D. A. Osguthorpe,
subject to the reservation of rights. The Dissolution Agreement recognizes and
declares that Smith had an ownership interest in the Property. If Smith lacked any
interest, as The Osguthorpes contend, the parties would not have agreed that he "sell"
anything to D. A. Osguthorpe.
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Other provisions of the Dissolution Agreement comport with this interpretation.
For example, the agreement consistently refers to Smith's right to receive future profits
as a reservation of his interest in the Property. (Dissolution Agreement, §§ 1(g), 3; R.
9, 12.) Through the Dissolution Agreement, Smith reserved certain rights in the
Property that he already had by virtue of the partnership; the agreement did not grant
these rights to him.
The scope of partnership property is governed by statute. "All property
originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently acquired by purchase or
otherwise on account of the partnership, is partnership property." Utah Code Ann.
§48-1-5 (1953). The Property was brought into partnership stock.
C.

P . A, Osguthorpe's extrinsic allegations relating to the disputed
Property and his intent are inadmissible. Smith is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Because the Dissolution Agreement unambiguously declares that the Property
was partnership property, D. A. Osguthorpe's belated allegations that the partnership
did not own the Property are inadmissible. The language of the Dissolution Agreement
is wholly determinative. Similarly, Osguthorpe's allegations that he never intended to
transfer the property to the partnership are also inadmissible. His present
characterizations of his intent are irrelevant; as a matter of law his intent was
established by the document that he signed over thirty years ago.
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D.

Even if the Property were not a partnership asset. Smith is entitled to
his share of the Lease proceeds.

As a partner, Smith was entitled to his share of partnership proceeds. He
retained that entitlement in the Dissolution Agreement. His right to his share of
partnership proceeds is not contingent, however, upon the disputed Property being a
partnership asset. That obligation arises from the Dissolution Agreement and exists
regardless of whether the Property is a partnership asset or D. A. Osguthorpe's
personal asset. D. A. Osguthorpe signed a written contract obligating him to give
Smith a share of the proceeds upon sale or lease of the Property. The Osguthorpes are
bound by that contract.
E.

The Dissolution Agreement was supported by consideration.

The Dissolution Agreement was supported by consideration. Paragraph 1
identifies the partnership property, including livestock, equipment, cash and real estate.
In paragraph 2, D. A. Osguthorpe agrees to pay Smith $50,000 for his share of those
partnership assets. In paragraph 3 of the Dissolution Agreement, Smith agrees to
execute and deliver to D. A. Osguthorpe "such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as
may be necessary" to transfer partnership assets. In paragraph 5, Smith and
D. A. Osguthorpe "release and discharge" each other from all claims arising out of
their partnership relationships. (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 2-6; R. 8-12.)
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The Dissolution Agreement also sets out various specific partnership disputes
that it resolves. These include bank loans, grazing fee accounts, amounts owed to
Enoch Smith Sons Company, tax liability, and responsibility for litigation filed against
Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe. (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 4-5; R. 10-11.) Resolution
of these real disputes constitutes consideration. The Osguthorpes argue that there was
no evidence of a bona fide dispute sufficient to support consideration. The Dissolution
Agreement puts that argument to rest: D. A. Osguthorpe agrees to hold Smith harmless
in the litigation then pending in the Third District Court by Ed Roberts, Howard
Whitehouse and Marion Christensen against Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe. (Dissolution
Agreement p. 5; R. 11.) Pending litigation is a bona fide dispute. Resolution as
between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe of that dispute is sufficient consideration.
Additionally, because the alleged oral side agreement between Smith and
D. A. Osguthorpe (i.e. that the partnership had been orally dissolved prior to the
execution of the Dissolution Agreement) does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, (as
discussed in Section III) it is unenforceable. As a matter of law, the Dissolution
Agreement is the only enforceable contract between the parties and its recited
consideration supports the contract.
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III.

THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT SATISFIES THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS. THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT TO DISSOLVE THE
PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT.
The Statute of Frauds applies to this case in two ways. It applies with respect to

whether the Property is a partnership asset. Because the Dissolution Agreement
declares that the Property is a partnership asset, the Statute of Frauds is satisfied. It
also applies with respect to whether the alleged prior oral agreement to dissolve the
partnership was effective. Because the partnership owned real property, the Statute of
Frauds required its dissolution to be in writing. Hence, even if there had been an oral
agreement to dissolve the partnership, it would be of no legal effect. The Statute of
Frauds provides:
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by the lawful agent
thereunto authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 (1953)
The Osguthorpes argue that D. A. Osguthorpe did not grant any interest in the
disputed Property to the partnership. The Statute of Frauds does not require that the
writing grant an interest in property. It is satisfied if the writing declares an interest in
property. In Guinand v. Walton. 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court
held that any writing signed by the party to be charged, which declares an interest in
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real property satisfies the Statute of Frauds. In Gumand, Walton-Kearns argued that a
letter did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and therefore failed to convey any interest in
a partnership. The letter was the only writing on die subject presented. The trial court
ruled in favor of Guinand and Walton-Kearns appealed. The Utah Supreme Court
stated:
From careful attention to the wording of that section [§ 255-1] it will be seen that there is no requirement either that
the instrument in writing demonstrate a valid consideration,
or that it be a complete contract in any other particular. All
that is required is that the interest be granted or declared by
a writing subscribed by the party to be charged. For the
purpose of establishing that there was such a grant by the
partnership it is not essential that its assets be described with
particularity. The purpose of the statute is that certain
matters of great importance such as the conveyance of real
estate should be protected against frauds and perjuries.
Guinand, 450 P.2d at 469 (emphasis added).
Here, the Dissolution Agreement itself satisfies Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. The
Dissolution Agreement is a writing in which the Property is declared an asset of the
partnership. Paragraph 1 states that "the partnership assets and properties covered
hereby shall include," and then lists various categories of property. Subparagraph 1(g)
lists and describes the Property. D. A. Osguthorpe's signature on the Dissolution
Agreement manifests his subscription or assent. Thus, the Dissolution Agreement is a
writing which satisfies the Statute of Frauds.
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Whether recorded fee title of the Property was in D. A. Osguthorpe's name is of
no legal significance. As the Dissolution Agreement declares, the Property was a
partnership asset. By statute, the Property was a partnership asset, irrespective of
record title. Utah Code Ann. §48-1-5 (1953). As a matter of law, a partner may
contribute property to a partnership without transferring title. See, Utah Code Ann.
§48-1-7. Once he does so, the partnership owns the property.
The Osguthorpes assert that the written Dissolution Agreement is not binding,
because D. A. Osguthorpe had a prior oral agreement with Smith. Under the terms of
the alleged oral agreement, The Osguthorpes claim that Smith agreed to transfer all of
the assets of the partnership, including the Property to D. A. Osguthorpe for $50,000.
The majority rule "is that a contract requiring a transfer of land from one partner or
joint venturer to another is within the Statute of Frauds." Johnson v. Gilbert. 621 P.2d
916 (Ariz. App. 1980), citing 2A. Corbin, Contracts, § 411 (1950 & Supp. 1971) and
Plummer v. Fogley, 363 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1961). An oral agreement to transfer
property, such as The Osguthorpes assert here, is of no effect.
The transfer of the Property to the partnership occurred by operation of law.
The partnership statute provides that property brought into the partnership belongs to
the partnership. It also occurred by declaration of the Dissolution Agreement. Once
the Property became partnership property, it could not be transferred back to
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D. A. Osguthorpe except by operation of law or conveyance or declaration in writing.
The Osguthorpes1 allegation of an oral agreement, even if true, is of no legal moment.
IV.

THE CLAIM THAT CONTINUED USE OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY
FOR GRAZING EXEMPTS OSGUTHORPE FROM SHARING THE
PAYMENTS FROM THE LEASE IS CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS
TERMS OF THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT.
The claim that, because The Osguthorpes are using the Property for grazing they

shouldn't have to split rental payments, is flawed because it takes the Dissolution
Agreement language out of context. The sentence: "So long as [D. A. Osguthorpe]
shall use said real property as grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep
or cattle business, [D. A. Osguthorpe] shall have the right to the possession and use of
the property without compensation to [Smith]" must be read in conjunction with the
next sentence, which says that if D. A. Osguthorpe or his successors sell or lease all or
any part of the Property Smith will share equally in the excess rental.
D. A. Osguthorpe's affidavit states that Smith's counsel assured him that the
Dissolution Agreement would only require payment if Osguthorpe ceased to use the
Property as grazing land. That statement contradicts the Dissolution Agreement, and is
barred by the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule.
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V.

THE LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OSGUTHORPES AND THE
CANYONS IS A LEASE, NOT AN EASEMENT.
The Canyons pays $200,000 per year to run a ski operation over the Property.

The Osguthorpes contend that The Canyons has a mere license. However, the lease
documents themselves make clear the intention of the parties to enter into a lease. The
original document is called a "LEASE AGREEMENT." It provides that
D. A. Osguthorpe "hereby leases the specific portion of Property to Wolf Mountain for
use as a commercial recreational area, including the installation, maintenance and
operation of two ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and such other related
facilities, structures and roads as may be required." (Lease Agreement, R. 69;
emphasis added.) Wolf Mountain agrees to pay "annual rental payments for the
Property." "The term of the lease shall expire twenty eight years from the execution
date." It is signed by D. A. Osguthorpe as "Lessor" and by a representative of Wolf
Mountain as "Lessee." The First Amendment contains similar terms. It provides that
"The Canyons will pay an additional $50,000 in lease payments for the term of the
August 14th, 1996 agreement" and is signed by Osguthorpe as "Lessor." (First
Amendment, H 10; R. 72; emphasis added.) Even the Second Amendment, executed
after this dispute arose, refers to Osguthorpe as the "Lessor" and obligates The
Canyons to pay "an additional $50,000 in lease payments." (Second Amendment, t 3;
R. 74; emphasis added.) And on November 25, 1998, The Osguthorpes executed a
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document entitled LANDLORD'S CONSENT, whereby they acknowledged that "that
certain lease dated August 14, 1996, between D. A. Osguthorpe and the
D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (collectively, "Landlord") and Wolf Mountain
Resorts, L.C. ("Tenant") (together with all amendments, modifications and extensions
thereof, the "Lease")" was "valid and in full force and effect,..."

(Landlord's

Consent, 1 1; R. 76-77.)
The Osguthorpes unfairly contend that Judge Iwasaki focused on the
nomenclature of the documents, rather than their substance. While the nomenclature of
the documents establishes that the parties intended the document to be a lease, Judge
Iwasaki examined the issue further. After reviewing the affidavits on file, he wrote in
the December 15, 1999 Memorandum Decision: "Further, it is uncontroverted that a
portion of the disputed Property is in the possession of The Canyons who have built ski
lifts and roads on it. Accordingly, Osguthorpefs claim that this was merely an
easement is without merit." (Memorandum Decision p. 6; R. 207.)
The Osguthorpes argue that an easement is a nonpossessory right to use
another's land whereas a lease is a right to exclusive possession of another's land for a
limited period of time. This does not address the issue of the joint use of land. The
Osguthorpes cannot interfere with the use of the property by The Canyons under the
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terms of the Lease Agreement. The Canyons has the possessory right to the property
for the purposes of its ski business. The agreement constitutes a lease of ski property.
The Osguthorpes cite a 1938 Massachusetts billboard case, Baseball Publishing
Co. v. Bruton. 18 N.E.2d 362, (Mass. 1938) for the proposition that a lease requires
possession of the premises whereas an easement does not. In Baseball Publishing, the
plaintiff executed a document giving it the right to attach a billboard to the side of a
building owned by the defendant. The defendant removed plaintiffs sign during the
term of the agreement and the plaintiff sued for specific performance. The trial court
ruled that the document granted plaintiff a "license" and awarded a decree of specific
performance. The appellate court ruled that the agreement, although titled a lease, only
granted a license or easement which under Massachusetts law was not a matter subject
to specific performance. The court concluded the document granted an "easement in
gross," which under Massachusetts law would entitle the plaintiff to specific
performance. Baseball Publishing. 18 N.E.2d at 57-8.
The Canyons does in fact have a possessory interest; it occupies the portion of
the property in question by having the supports of the ski lifts on the premises.
VI.

THE LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN OSGUTHORPE AND THE
CANYONS IS NOT A PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACT.
The Osguthorpes also argue, contradictorily, that the Lease Agreement is really

a personal services contract. The evidence in support of this argument is inadmissible
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because it violates the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. In essence, The
Osguthorpes are attempting to modify the Lease Agreement by allocating a portion of
the lease payments to personal services. This type of oral modification is a legal
nullity.
The Osguthorpes repeatedly assert that Smith is a stranger to the Lease
Agreement.

Smith is no stranger. As Judge Iwasaki determined, "it is clear that the

Partnership Dissolution Agreement of November 3, 1966 gives Smith the right to
protect his interest in half the lease payments and provides liim privity with respect to
any agreements entered into affecting his right to those lease payments."
(Memorandum Decision of May 25, 2001, p. 7; R. 797.)
"Privity of contract is the 'mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of
property.' Collins Co. Ltd. v. Carboline Co.. 532 N.E.2d 834, 839 (111. 1988)."
Kaplan v. Shure Bros.. Inc., 153 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1998). Smith and The Osguthorpes
enjoy a mutual relationship to the Property. They are to divide any lease or sale
proceeds of the Property. Hence, they are in privity with respect to that Property and
with respect to any leases or contracts of sale of the land. Because the Dissolution
Agreement provides Smith with privity to protect his share of the lease payments, the
Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence Rule apply to bar any oral modification of
Osguthorpe's lease agreement with The Canyons.
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The Osguthorpes counter that the Lease and its amendments are not integrated
and thus are not subject to the parol evidence rule. In fact, the Lease Agreement, as
amended, is an integrated document. It states clearly that The Canyons is paying first,
$100,000, then $150,000, then $200,000 for use of the disputed Property. This Court
recently considered the parol evidence rule in Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v. Smedley.
2001 UT App 141, 11 18-21, 27 P.3d 565. Glauser and Smedley entered into a real
estate exchange. Smedley sought to introduce parol evidence contradicting the
language of the written agreements. This Court rejected the attempt because the
written document was not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
It thus leaves no room for the presentation of parol evidence
to controvert that expressed intent. . . . Accordingly, the
trial court correctly excluded evidence of any
contemporaneous oral agreements Smedley allegedly had
with Glauser and correctly concluded that '[t]he 1979
Agreement . . . is clear on its face and unambiguous in its
terms relating to the parties' intent that Defendant Smedley
transfer fee title absolute to the [Glausers].f
Glauser Storage. 2001 UT App 141, 1 23.
In this case, the Lease Agreement, as amended, is clear on its face that The
Canyons is paying to rent the Property for ski runs. The document makes no reference
to payment to D. A. Osguthorpe or his son Stephen for personal services. Indeed,
Carrig testified that The Canyon's payments in 1998 and 1999 reflected payment under
the Lease Agreement itself. (Carrig Deposition, P. 54; R. 390.). In short, the Lease
-27-

Agreement is unambiguous in its terms, and those terms do not include any payment
for personal services. Parol evidence contrary to these undisputed terms is
inadmissible.
The Osguthorpes' claim to a side oral agreement is also barred by the Statute of
Frauds (for which integration is irrelevant). Utah's Statute of Frauds includes the
following provision: "[e]very contract for the leasing [of land] for a longer period than
one year...shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made." Utah Code
Ann. §25-5-3. Utah courts have regularly upheld the application of §25-5-3 as
rendering void lease agreements for a period of longer than one year. See, SCM Land
Co. v. Watkins & Faber. 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986) (holding that a three year lease
never reduced to writing was unenforceable); Brown1 s Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d
357 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that a lease for a period longer than one year requires a
writing); Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997) (upholding
§25-5-3 as applied to leases of more than one year); W. Daniel English v. Standard
Optical Co.. 814 P.2d 613 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that the Statute of Frauds bars
enforcement of oral leases of more than one year).
Of course, in this case, the Lease Agreement is in writing, as are its
amendments. The Statute of Frauds requires that any modification to that lease also be
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in writing. In Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions. Inc.. 48 P.2d 489, 491-92
(Utah 1935), the Utah Supreme Court held that a "contract required by the statute of
frauds to be in writing cannot be modified by a subsequent oral agreement," and that
the "oral modification of a contract required by the statute of frauds to be in writing
will not be permitted."
The principle of Bamberger remains good law. "[W]hen the statute of frauds
requires a contract to be in writing, Utah Code Ann. §25-5-3 (1984), any alteration or
modification must also be in writing." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d
275, 279 (Utah App. 1987). "In essence, the argument is that the written lease was in
effect modified to include a new term. However, it is settled law that a modification of
a contract must be in writing under the Statute of Frauds." SCM Land Company. 732
P.2d at 108.
Even if the alleged personal services agreement is considered as an agreement
separate from the Lease Agreement, it is still barred by the Statute of Frauds. Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-4 provides:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing,
signed by the party to be charged with agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making of the
agreement; ...

-29-

The so-called "personal services contract" that The Osguthorpes claim to have
with the Canyons must necessarily parallel the years specified in the Lease Agreement.
Pasquinv. Pasquin. 1999 UT App 245, 988 P 2d 1, cert denied 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah,
2000), holding that an oral lifetime employment contract was not barred by the statute
of frauds since, depending on the lifetime of the employee, it was a contract that could
be performed within one year, does not apply in this case. The Osguthorpes claim that
the annual payments, designed to extend over a period of 28 years, were partly for their
services. It is impossible for them to perform the services in one year. Thus, the oral
agreement is invalid.
Summary judgment was properly granted because The Osguthorpes did not offer
admissible evidence to dispute the terms of the Lease Agreement.
In addition, there was no consideration for the alleged side agreement. The
Lease Agreement obligates The Canyons to pay $100,000 as annual rental for the
property described in the Lease. The written amendments increase the rental payments
in exchange for the right to use the real property more extensively. Neither the Lease
Agreement nor its written amendments make reference to any payment for personal
services. The amounts paid by The Canyons under the Lease Agreement cannot
constitute consideration for a side agreement as well. If The Canyons is to provide
consideration for a side agreement, it must be with new money.
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Judge Iwasaki also correctly held that the alleged side agreement fails for lack of
definiteness. (Memorandum Decision, September 12, 2000, p. 6; R. 607.) "It is
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is
essential to the formation of a contract. . . . An agreement cannot be enforced if its
terms are indefinite or demonstrate that there was no intent to contract." Richard
Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996).
The terms of the alleged side agreement are indefinite.

The Canyons made no

effort to value the services that D. A. Osguthorpe or his son allegedly performed.
(Carrig Deposition, p. 38; R. 387.) Similarly, The Canyons made no effort to allocate
how much of the money it was paying might be for consultation services. (Carrig
Deposition, p. 40; R. 389.) Price is one of the key terms of a contract. Because the
alleged side agreement contained no price term, it is indefinite, and unenforceable.
VIL

THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE
RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION.
The Dissolution Agreement says that if D. A. Osguthorpe leases the Property

for more than $1.60 per acre per year, he and Smith "shall share equally" in the lease
revenues. The Osguthorpes say that this straightforward provision is a restraint upon
alienation. To the contrary, it is merely an agreed upon method of splitting up the
profits after the Property has been alienated. In this case, there is good evidence that
the "anti-alienation provision" did not prevent alienation: The Osguthorpes in fact
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alienated the Property by leasing it for 28 years. The Osguthorpes complain, not that
they couldn't alienate the Property, but that they can't keep all of the proceeds for
themselves.
The anti-alienation rules apply only where a conveyance or contract causes a
later conveyance to be void, to be subject to contractual liability when such liability
results from a breach of an agreement not to convey, or to terminate all or part of the
property interest conveyed. Restatement of Property, Section 404. None of those
conditions applies here. The Lease Agreement with The Canyons is not void. The
Osguthorpes' contractual liability results, not from a breach of an agreement not to
convey, but from an agreement to apportion profits after conveyance. The Lease
Agreement does not terminate any part of the property interest conveyed. The rules
against alienation simply do not apply in this case.
This principle was enunciated in Broach v. City of Hampton, Arkansas. 677
S.W.2d 851 (Ark. 1984). The Broaches sold acreage to the City of Hampton for
sewage ponds. The City subsequently sold part of the acreage back to the Broaches,
but reserved the right to buy back as much of the acreage as it needed for future
expansion of the ponds. As the City grew, it needed the acreage, and approached the
Broaches to buy the land back. The Broaches refused, claiming that the option to
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repurchase placed an unreasonable restraint upon alienation of the land. Arkansas'
Supreme Court said the Broaches' argument was "without merit."
The language in this deed does not create an unreasonable
restraint on alienation for the simple reason that it does not
constitute a restraint on alienation as above defined. There
is no language by which the Broaches promise not to sell nor
is there any language prohibiting the alienation of the land
or causing forfeiture upon attempted alienation. The
Broaches were free at all times to sell the interest they
owned in the land.
Id. at 855.
Similarly, The Osguthorpes were always free to sell or lease the Property. The
Dissolution Agreement contains no language by which D. A. Osguthorpe promises not
to sell or which causes forfeiture upon alienation. Distasteful to them as it may be, the
Dissolution Agreement merely requires The Osguthorpes to share profits.
LaFond v. Rumler, 574 N.W.2d 40 (Mich.App. 1997), upon which The
Osguthorpes rely, is inapposite. Rumler agreed to sell LaFond, by means of a land
contract, a parcel of property for $60,000. During negotiations over the terms, a third
party offered Rumler $80,000. Rumler needed the $20,000 down-payment that LaFond
was offering. LaFond and Rumler agreed that LaFond would buy the property for
$60,000, pay the $20,000 down payment with monthly installment payments of $400,
then immediately resell the property to the third party for $80,000. She would split the
profit on this transaction with Rumler. The agreement gave Rumler the right to
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approve the sale terms. If he didn't agree, appraisers would be hired to determine if
the sale terms were reasonable. When LaFond tried to sell the property to the third
party, the third party agreed to pay $80,000, but by means of a land contract. Rumler
refused to agree, because he wanted his cash up front. The deal fell apart. LaFond.
574 N.W.2d at 41-42.
The LaFond court said this was an unreasonable restraint on alienation because it
gave the appraiser control over the sales price. "The appraiser may decide that the
property is worth more than a new purchaser is willing to pay, hence disrupting a
prospective sale and in effect creating an unreasonable restraint on alienation." Id. at
456.
No such consideration is at play in this case. The Osguthorpes alone decided to
lease the Property, and are now receiving $200,000 per year for it. Smith had no
control over the lease and could not disrupt a prospective good faith sale or lease. It is
also interesting to note that LaFond does not hold that the circumstances were a
restraint on alienation, but that they "in effect" created a restraint. Utah has not
expanded its law to prohibit "effective" unreasonable restraints on alienation. Under
LaFond. real estate partners can still split profits, they just can't defer to an appraiser
the final determination of the sales price.
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Osguthorpe also cites White v. White. 251 A.2d 470 (NJ. Super. 1969) in
support of his contention. In White, a man left his house to his grandnephew, with a
provision in his will that if the grandnephew sold the house within 15 years he would
split the proceeds with his brother and sister. The house caught fire, causing the greatuncle's death. The grandnephew and his siblings squabbled over whether the fire
insurance proceeds should be distributed as being equivalent to a "sale" of the property,
or whether they should be used to repair the property. The New Jersey Court held that
the provision in the will was invalid. White. 251 A.2d at 474.
White v. White is not a Utah case and should not be applied beyond its facts. It
is distinguishable from this case in at least four ways. First, it did not involve the
dissolution of a partnership. Second, it did not involve a contract. Third, it was not
based on an agreement by the party to be restricted. Fourth, it involved suburban
residential property not under-eloped rural pastures. These distinctions are significant,
because Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe reached an agreement about a fair distribution of
partnership assets. In White, the court was forced to determine what a testator would
have done with insurance proceeds had he lived. No such speculation is required here
because Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe expressed their agreement in writing.
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VIII. STEPHEN OSGUTHORPE AND THE CANYONS ARE NOT
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.
The Osguthorpes moved to dismiss Dick Smith's complaint on the ground that
Stephen Osguthorpe, (also referred to as "Stephen") and The Canyons were
indispensable parties under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge
Iwasaki denied the motion, but invited Stephen Osguthorpe and The Canyons to oppose
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment, if they chose. The Canyons did not. Stephen,
however, filed a memorandum opposing summary judgment which was considered by
the trial court. "Ordinarily, a trial court's determination properly entered under Rule
19 will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Seftel v. Capital City Bank.
767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989): aff'dsub nom. Landes v. Capital Citv Bank. 795 P.2d
1127 (Utah 1990). Judge Iwasaki did not abuse his discretion.
If The Osguthorpes felt that Stephen and The Canyons were truly indispensable
parties to the litigation, they should have named them. In Landes v. Capital City Bank.
795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), Landes argued that the SBA should have been joined as an
indispensable party. The Supreme Court noted that if Landes had been concerned
about the absence of the SBA, he could have included the SBA as a defendant in the
original complaint, or he could have requested leave to amend under Rule 15. "Having
himself failed to join the SBA, Landes cannot now complain that the court's failure to
require joinder of the SBA is reversible error." Landes. 795 P.2d at 1132.
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Stephen is a general partner in the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership. The
Family Partnership appeared in this lawsuit and has always been represented by
counsel. Stephen sat at counsel table at some of the hearings as a representative of the
Family Partnership. He was fully apprised of the conduct of the litigation. He knew
that Dick Smith sought to recover his half of the lease payments. Despite this
knowledge, Stephen took no action to join the lawsuit personally nor to seek joinder of
The Canyons.
Rule 19(a)(2) allows joinder where there is a substantial risk of inconsistent
obligations. However, no substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations exists
where there is only a risk of a frivolous lawsuit or where the absent party has no cause
of action against the parties already named. Boczon v. Northwestern Elevator Co.,
Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1482, 1487 (E.D.Wis. 1987).
The Canyons has no claim against Stephen Osguthorpe under the Lease
Agreement. As Judge Iwasaki rightly found on summary judgment, the Lease
Agreement is an integrated contract, which unambiguously provides that The Canyons
will pay $200,000 per year to The Osguthorpes for the right to use the described real
estate. A claim by The Canyons that the Lease Agreement also requires Stephen
Osguthorpe (or anyone else) to perform personal services would fail for the reasons
stated above - i.e., the Statute of Frauds, the parole evidence rule, and lack of
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consideration. The Canyons would also fail in a claim against Stephen Osguthorpe for
personal services because the alleged side agreement was indefinite: "the lack of any
price term makes this side agreement unenforceable." (Memorandum Decision,
September 12, 2000, page 6; R. 607.)
IX.

JUDGE IWASAKI PROPERLY DENIED AMENDMENT.
The Osguthorpes sought to amend their answer to assert a counterclaim. Judge

Iwasaki denied his motion because the claims The Osguthorpes sought to assert were
disposed of by Dick Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment. Under Rule 15 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court's decision about amendment is granted
deference, and is overturned only if it was an abuse of discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp.
v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). In their Brief, The Osguthorpes state that it
would be an abuse of discretion to deny amendment if this case is remanded. If the
case is not remanded, the issue is moot. If it is remanded, The Osguthorpes can seek to
amend, and Judge Iwasaki can make a determination based on the circumstances then
existing.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered below should be affirmed.
DATED this 7 "day of March, 2002.
MOYLE & DRAPER
By

3

Hardin A. Whitney
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By /£{U Avlfc
Robert G. Wing ]
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee
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ADDENDUM NO. 1
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AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered i n t o t h i s

p ~~*

day of November, 1966, by and between ENOCH 8MITH, JR., of S a l t
Lake C i t y , Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r referred t o as F i r s t Party, and
D# A. OSGUTHORPE, of S a l t Lake County, State of Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as Second Party,
NITNB86BTH1
WHEREAS, F i r s t and Second P a r t i e s , for over ten (10)
years were partners primarily engaged in the c a t t l e and sheep
b u s i n e s s e s , having operated under the partnership names of
Av & En, Aveneen Land & Livestock Company, and Aveneen Partners h i p , and a s Red Pine Land & Livestock Company, and i n some
i n s t a n c e s operated some portions of the partnership b u s i n e s s e s
under t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l names without d i s c l o s i n g the partnership
r e l a t i o n s h i p between them; and
WHEREAS, F i r s t and Second Parties have heretofore
terminated a l l partnership r e l a t i o n s entered i n t o by them as
p a r t n e r s and have discontinued the partnership b u s i n e s s e s ,
d i s s o l v e d t h e partnership or partnerships that have heretofore
e x i s t e d between them, and now d e s i r e t o s e t t l e a l l of the r i g h t s
between them i n the partnership businesses and a f f a i r s ;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between

^
U

"\

F i r s t and Second Parties as follows s
Except as hereinafter reserved to First Party, First
Party agrees t o s e l l to Second Party a l l of

First Party's

r i g h t , t i t l e , i n t e r e s t and estate in and to a l l partnership

y^
O
Q

(
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assets, and Second Party agrees to purchase from First Party
all of his said right, title, interest and estate in and to
all partnership assets upon the following terms and conditions,
to-witi
1.

The partnership assets and properties covered

hereby shall includei
(a)

Any cash on hand and all accounts receivable

(b)

All sheep, including ewes, bucks and lambs,

this datej

together with all registered brands and markings;
(c)

All grazing permits and rights, including

the Grazing Permit* located within what is known and designated by the Bureau of Land Management, U. S. Department of
the Interior as the Fillmore, Utah, Grazing District, heretofore purchased from T, Tracy Wright, together with the right
to purchase an additional 500 head of sheep Permit or License
as provided in the Agreement dated the 24th day of October,
1961, between the said T. Tracy Wright, as Seller, and the
parties hereto as Buyers; Wasatch National Forest Permits for
619 head of sheep; United States Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Land Management, License for Taylor Grazing Rights,
Park City Area-Summit, U, number and class 60 S, Unit 72;
(d)

c o

All Leases, including State of Utah Public

Land Lease No. 10925, covering 487.28 acres in Section 2,

K.X

Township 2 South, Range 3 Bast, Summit County, Utah;
Grazing Lease from Edward Bagley and Irvin T. Nelson,

^"

covering property located in Salt Lake County, Utah;

o

O
(e)

All horses and other animals, if any, in

addition to the sheep;
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(f)

All trucks, machinery and equipment;

(g)

In addition to the above described property,

First Party agrees to sell to 8econd Party, his interest in
the following described real property located in Summit
County, Utah, subject, however, to the reservation of interests therein by First Party as hereinafter specifically
sot forthi
\
Y(
^
j '

Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Sec. 1; T. 2 8., R. 3 E.,
Salt Lake Meridian.
Lota, 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the BE quarter of
Sec^ 3, T. 2 8« R. 3 B«, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Beginning at a point 1208.5 feet South l°48 l
West from the Northeast corner of Section 1,
Township 2 8outh, Range 3 Bast, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, running thence South 1*48' West
2 feet, thence South 36*08* West 168.7 feet,
thence North 89°50* West 3082.6 feet, thence
North O ^ 1 Bast 139.2 feet, thence South
89°50' East 3177.6 feet to point of beginning,
containing 10 acres.
Total acres 577.33, more or less.
So long as Second Party shall use said real property as

grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep or
cattle business, Second Party shall have the right to the possession and use of the property without compensation to First Party,
but he shall pay the taxes and any expense of maintairing the
property.

In the event, however, that Second Party or his

successor or successors in interest, during the lifetime of the

~T\

survivor of First and Second Parties, plus twenty-one (21) years,

Li

,
c.
in a good faith transaction, shall sell the property, or any part <r
i —

thereof at a price exceeding Twenty Dollars ($20,00) per acre,
plus the depreciated cost of any fencing that Second Party may

^
^1

have caused to be done on the property, then First Party shall

CD
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share equally with Second Party in the sales price paid over
Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per acre, plus said depreciated fencing
cost, and if, during said period of time he, or his successor
or successors in interest in the property shall lease all or any
part of the property, for any period of time commencing during
said retained interest period, at a price in excess of $1.60
per acre per year. First Party shall share equally in the excess
rental over the $1.60 per acre per year. Furthermore, Party of
the First Part shall retain an undivided one-half (1/2) interest
in all mineral and oil rights in the property without limit as
to time.
2.

Second Party agrees to pay First Party for his

interest in the above described property, and in settlement of
all claims heretofore existing between the parties arising out
of any of the partnership business or businesses, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) cash, payment thereof to be
made within thirty (30) days from date hereof.

In addition to

the payment of said Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) to First
Party, Second Party agrees to assume, pay and otherwise perform
all of the outstanding obligations of the partnership businesses,
whether incurred under the name of Av & En, Aveneen Land & Livestock Company, Aveneen Partnership, Red Pine Land & Livestock
O
Company, or in any other names, including the personal names of
the parties hereto. Specifically included in these obligations, ,_~
but not excluding any other obligations, are any and all bank

c

-

loans, including the amounts owing Walker Bank & Trust Company,
the loan made by Utah Livestock Production Credit Association,

v^
O
the accounts owing for grazing fees to Bothwell and Swanner Co.
°
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and t o Edward Bagley and I r v i n T. Nelson on t h e i r

g r a z i n g l e a s e , and every and a l l other o b l i g a t i o n s of any of
t h e s a i d p a r t n e r s h i p s , whether or not s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t

forth

h e r e i n ; e x c e p t , that Second Party w i l l not assume any indebtedn e s s owing by any of the said partnerships t o Enoch Smith Sons
Company on account of work done by said company for the partner*s h i p a , e x c e p t t h a t Second Party s h a l l pay Enoch Smith Sons
Company for the advance made by i t on account of l e a s e f e e s t o
Bothwell and Swanner Co. i n the sum of $ 2 , 1 7 6 . 5 0 .

Further, Second

p a r t y agrees t o assume any income tax l i a b i l i t y for the current
year and on account of any audits that may h e r e a f t e r be made of
the income tax returns heretofore f i l e d covering the p a r t n e r s h i p b u s i n e s s or b u s i n e s s e s .

Provided, however, t h a t F i r s t Party

w i l l r e t a i n a l l of h i s books, records and other accounts r e l a t i n g
t o t h e p a r t n e r s h i p b u s i n e s s e s for a period of a t l e a s t s i x y e a r s ,
and w i l l f u l l y cooperate with Second Party in connection with any
a u d i t s or other q u e s t i o n s raised i n connection with the p a r t n e r s h i p s ' income tax r e t u r n s .

Further, Second Party agrees t o save

F i r s t Party harmless on account of that c e r t a i n s u i t brought in
the D i s t r i c t Court of Summit County, by Ed Roberts, Howard

^
K^
Whitehouse and Marion Chriatenaen, as p l a i n t i f f s , a g a i n s t F i r s t J^J
and Second P a r t i e s , Case No. 3527.

Second Party t o assume the

<a

d e f e n s e of the a c t i o n on behalf of both himself and F i r s t Party,

crand t o pay a l l c o s t s and expenses, including a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s

^2r

t h a t Second Party may incur in defense of the a c t i o n and any

CD
O
OP

judgment that the plaintiffs in said action, or any of them,
may obtain against First Party.

-63. Upon payment in full of the purchase price to be
paid by Second Party to First Party as hereinabove in paragraph
2 provided, First Party agrees to execute and deliver to Second
Party such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as may be necessary to transfer and convey to Second Party all of the interest
in the partnership businesses of First Party as hereinabove
provided, with the exception of the interests retained by him
in the real property specifically hereinabove described in
paragraph 1 (g) .
4.

The parties hereto agree that the Partnerships

heretofore existing between them have been dissolved as of the
17th day of January, 1966, effective January 1, 1966, and notice
thereof has heretofore been published as provided by law.

Neither

party has authority to wind up partnership affairs and Second
Party, by this Agreement, has succeeded to all of said partnership affairs upon the terms and conditions hereinabove set forth.
5.

Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the

parties hereto do hereby release and discharge one another from
all claims of whatsoever nature arising out of their former
partnership relationships.

^

WITNESS the execution hereof by the parties hereto,
the year and day hereinabove first written.

EXHIBIT A pg. 6
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STATB OF UTAH,

)
)

88,

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE, )
On t h e

3 -

day of fJVyUu/f^

. 1966, p e r s o n a l l y

.appeared b e f o r e me ENOCH SMITH, JR. one of the s i g n e r s of the
y'x^l

L£fl£ove- i n s t r u m e n t , who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t he e x e c u t e d

lV\*«

• Notary mibli
Residing in S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

)
) 88.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, )
On the

3 ~

day of //fsft~ftU**£c^/~.

1966, personally

appeared before me D. A. OSGUTHORPE, one of the signers of the
,«^K(\Vfl?J5»6vfi instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed

f

A

' f\ -*:-x/-• *

N o t a r y Pi
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t I&ke C o u n t y , U t a h

I,

AFTON S , OSGUTHORPE, t h e w i f e o f D. A. O s g u t h o r p e ,

Second p a r t y i n t h e

f o r e g o i n g Agreement, do h e r e b y a p p r o v e t h e

above and f o r e g o i n g Agreement and a g r e e t h a t any i n t e r e s t

(g) o f t h e A g r e e m e n t s h a l l be s u b j e c t

t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of

s a i d p a r a g r a p h 1 (g) and t h e o t h e r a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e
foregoing

Agreement-

[••-;

that

I may h a v e i n a n d t o t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d i n p a r a g r a p h
1

K\

<J~
^
CD
CO
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-'Py S^-^nrijLZaLL..

STATE OF UTAH,

1966.

)

) as,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, )
*

that .y.

X'^X.-:''""?'??""""'• »"° 1°ly ==kno»l6agoa to m
•/<.;•.,?'; % V V * r

"*

that

8h

® executed

A

^

Notary ifvbli
Residing in Salt iZake County.utah

B00KM9
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ADDENDUM NO. 2

i-LAifc AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made bv and between n A n t r . m ,
OSGUTH
OSGUTHORPE FAMILY PARTNERS^ ,< ?
O R P E and D.A
M0U
RESORTS, L.C.«lessee. O A ^ S c ^
^ ^
^AIN
P
described ,n E*h,bi, "A" ( h e r e t n a n S
^ Z ^ r
^
P
consist
approximately 560 acres. Wolf Mountain is a ski/sunL
^ *
" g of
perator
intends to expand fts operation to the pTperry.
' ""* °
«*

and Doc's Knob chair life as i
^
S
f
f
Speafietfj, S a d d I c b
Doc's Knob and lower sliver
rtte^Z^l
^ " ' " ^ M trails s ^ i n g
"A". Notwithstanding therigte« S
wX
^ i d e n t £ f i e d on E ^ i f
shall be pennmed to i n r p r c v e l n V C £ I T ^ ^ T ^
° W h o ^
improvement or use does not interfere with S
l
^
' *"*
wi
of Lessee. Ski trails lifts a„d feciH»„Th,llfT
*™l* structures and runs
« (40 acres) and « " < « ^
^
^
J
^
E
S
?
f T ™ ™
d f Ule
Property descnbed in Exhibit "A" paragraph 1.
°
Wolf Mountain shall pay to D A rkomr^™
i
Property in the a m o i i j ' i ^ S S S ^ S S S T , « "

?

AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, te/ycSy of A u ^ 19%

D.A. Osgufro

y Panncrsl

WITNESS

ffltfi// Gu*uu£XH/fi/7 "B"

0 0 4 6 0 5 9 2

EK009SS PG00780

'?&CT[OH

°?
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ADDENDUM NO. 3

enca
; Skiin
Lompa

£
The following agreement amends and clarifies the existing agreement dated the 14th day
of August, 1996 between Wolf Mountain (now The Canyons) and the Osguthorpe family:

Killington,

1) The Canyons will construct a jeep/snowmobile road from the top
of Saddleback towards Red Pine Lake and on toward the bottom of
Saddleback area. The road will also be continued from the top of
Saddleback to the northwest corner of Section 3. Steve Osguthorpe and
Blaise Carrig to approve the alignment prior to construction.

VT

Sunday River, M£
Sugzrbu$h,

VT

Mount Snow, V T
Haystack.

VT

2) The Canyons will relocate and upgrade the existing Saddleback
lift to the location approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig.

SugzrloafAJSA. M£

3) The Canyons will be able to complete the Saddleback area trail
construction as approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig.

Pico. VT

Atttosh Bear Pezkt

4) The Canyons are able to relocate and upgrade the existing
Spotted Owl chair to the location shown on the attached map. This
relocation to be approved by and Blaise Carrig and Steve Osguthorpe.
5) The Canyons will repair and upgrade the lower jeep road on
Osguthorpe property as shown on the attached map for
construction and maintenance access.
6) The Canyons will construct and maintain a road on Osguthorpe
property from Red Pine Lake to the top of Tombstone. This road is
to be used by the Canyons construction and maintenance only.
7) The Canyons commits to working with the Osguthorpe family to
ensure that snowmobile and horse riding operation can continue for
the entire terms of this agreement. The Canyons committed to
working with the Osguthorpes to resolve any issues of the
interference or conflict between these operations and the ski
development.
8) The Canyons can construct a ski trail that crosses the south west corner
of lot 5 of the Osguthorpe property quarter section. This trail to be
approved by Steve Osguthorpe and and Blaise Carrig
Sunday River Road

9) The Canyons will include the Osguthorpes in their master planning
process.

P O Box 4S0
Bethel Maine 04217
207.824.3100 tel
207.S24.S110 fax

10) The Canyons will pay an additional $50,000 in lease payments for the
term of the August 14th, 1996 agreement to the Osguthorpes in
consideration for this agreement..

Menca.
SWing
pmpai]

Both parties agree to work together in good faith and to maintain open
communications. The Canyons accepts the obligation to notice and seek approval
from the Osguthorpes on any matters of change to their lands.

Kill'mpton, VT
Sunday River, ME
Sugarbush, VT

AGREED.. GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 2Sih day of July, 1997

Mount Snow, VT

For The Canyons

For the Osguthorpes

Haystack VT
SugarloafAJSA, ME
Attitash Bear Peak
Pico. VT

Leslie B. Otten, President
The Canyons (Formally Wolf Mountain Resort)

Blaise Carrig, Managing Directed J
The Canyons (Formally Wolf Mountain Resort)

Stey£ Osguthorpe

WITNESS:

F>

>"l_ *S?- </\—-

(A^TCLO*

(.

/c IU & ' ° * - ^ ^?.

S/?Cct*/

Sunday River Road
PO

eox 450

Bethel, Maine 0421
207,824.8100 tel
207.824.S110 fax

ADDENDUM NO. 4

The following agreament is a second amendment to the August 14,1996 agreement between Wolf Mountain
(now The Canyons) and the Osguthorpe family. This agreement is in addition to the August 14, 1996
agreement and the first amendment of My 2S4 1997.
1)

The Canyons wiB construct and maintain & work access roadfromthe existing road at Red Pine Lake
through the south end of section 3 towards the area known as Ninety Nine - 90. Steve Osguthorpe
ar-d Blaise Carrig to approve the alignment of the road prior to constnicrioa

2)

The Canyons will be permitted to have alpine ski operations (consistent with their current operations)
on the nonh side of Ninety Nine - 90 and through the southeast comer of section 3.

3)

In consideration for this agreement. The Canyons will pay an additionai $50,000.00 in lease payments
for the term of August 14,1996 agreement.

4)

The Canyons acknowledges that under this Agreement, theAugust 14,1996 Agreement and the July
28, 1997 first amendment to the August 14t 1996 Agreement, the Osguthorpe family and D.A.
Osguthorpe have retained the right to use all of the property which is the subject of those
Agreements, *as part of their ranch operation (tndudiag sheep and cattle) and to otherwise use and
improve such property, so long a* such ranch operalion and other use and improvements do not
damage the towers and oth^ facilities constructed on the property by the Canyons (and as
predecessors in interest) and do not unreasonably interfere with the use of the property in the winter
as part of the Canyons* winter skiing operations. The Canyons' agrees that the use of the properly
by the Canyons' during the spring, summer, andfell,will not interfere with the ranch operations of
the Osguthorpe family and D.A. Osguthorpe.

Both parties agree to work together in good faith and maintain open communication.
AGREED, G3RANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 10th day of August, 1998.
For The Canyons

For the Osguthorpe

: Canig, Managing
Director
The Canyons
D.A Osgutho:
M
F«tmiIyP<

WITNESS
-i?o^

*t
amcoy7\2J7H4-:

^^Lv_

UL {M

